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General
Notes:
The strong,
healthy boy born to "Light Horse Harry" and Ann Carter Lee on January 19, 1807
was the last Lee born at Stratford to survive to maturity. Though he spent fewer
than four years there, his later boyhood visits left an impression that he
carried throughout his life.
As sometimes happens in distinguished families, one member seems to fall heir to
the best qualities of the previous generations and none of the flaws. So it was
with Robert Edward Lee. From both the Carters and the Lees he inherited a
handsome countenance. From his father came rare physical strength and endurance.
The sense of duty that Harry had learned from George Washington was vividly
imparted to his son Robert. Even "Light Horse Harry's" difficulties with money
seemed to have produced positive responses in Robert, who throughout his life
was meticulous and prudent in all finacial matters.
Ann Carter Lee's gentleness was inherited by Robert, and his loving care of his
ailing mother was the mainstay of her life. With his father and elder brothers
away, and his mother and sisters in failing health, Robert had become, by age
12, head of the household. On cold afternoons, when his mother was well enough,
young Robert would stuff paper in the cracks of the carriage to block the wind
and take her driving. Years later, when he left for West Point, Ann Lee wrote to
a cousin, "How I will get on without Robert? He is both a son and daughter to
me."
Robert Lee's choice of a military career was dictated by financial necessity.
There was no money left to send him to Harvard, where his older brother Charles
Carter studied. Such circumstances led him to an appointment to West Point
Military Academy. Robert, who led the Cadet Corps in 1829, graduated second in
his class. In four years he received not a single demerit, and he became one of
the most popular cadets in his class. When he returned as the Academy's
superintendent years later, he won the same affectionate respect from the cadets
for his compassion, sense of fairness and strong moral leadership.
On June 30, 1831, while serving as Second Lieutenant of Engineers at Fort
Monroe, Virginia, he married Mary Ann Randolph Custis of Arlington. Mary was the
only daughter of George Washington Parke Custis, the grandson of Martha
Washington and the adopted grandson of George Washington. Robert E. Lee shared
his father's reverence for the memory of the General and that bond with the
Father of our Country served as an inspiration throughout Lee's life.
The couple moved into Arlington, the Custis house across the Potomac from
Washington, D.C., which would later become Arlington National Cemetery.
At the outbreak of the Mexican-American War in 1846, Robert was ordered to
Mexico as a supervisor of road construction. His skills as a cavalryman in
reconnaissance, however, soon captured the attention of General Winfield Scott,
who came to rely on Robert for his sharp military expertise. It was in Mexico
that Lee learned the battlefield tactics that would serve him so well in coming
years.
In spite of his flawless performance as an engineer and his brilliance as an
officer, promotion came slowly for Robert Lee. His assignments were lonely and
difficult, and he found the separation from his family hard to bear. His love of
Mary and his ever-increasing brood of children were the center of his life.
The opportunity that won him enduring fame was one he would have preferred not
to have taken. The Army of the United States had been his life's work for 32
years, and he had given it his very best. On April 18, 1861, he was finally
offered the reward for his service.
On the eve of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln, through Secretary
Francis Blair, offered him command of the Union Army. There was little doubt as
to Lee's sentiments. He was utterly opposed to secession and considered slavery
evil. His views on the United States were equally clear - "no north, no south,
no east, no west," he wrote, "but the broad Union in all its might and strength
past and present."
Blair's offer forced Lee to choose between his strong conviction to see the
country united in perpetuity and his responsibility to family, friends and his
native Virginia. A heart-wrenching decision had to be made. After a long night
at Arlington, searching for an answer to Blair's offer, he finally came
downstairs to Mary. "Well Mary," he said calmly, "the question is settled. Here
is my letter of resignation." He could not, he told her, lift his hand against
his own people. He had "endeavored to do what he thought was right," and replied
to Blair that "...though opposed to secession and a deprecating war, I could
take no part in the invasion of the Southern States." He resigned his commission
and left his much beloved Arlington to "go back in sorrow to my people and share
the misery of my native state."
On June 1, 1862 Robert Edward Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern
Virginia in the Confederate capital of Richmond. Not until February 1865 was he
named Commander in Chief of all Confederate forces, but the leadership
throughout the war was undeniably his. His brilliance as a commander is
legendary, and military colleges the world over study his compaigns as models of
the science of war. That he held out against an army three times the size and a
hundred times better equipped was no miracle. It was the result of leadership by
a man of exceptional intelligence, daring, courage and integrity. His men all
but worshiped him. He shared their rations, slept in tents as they did, and,
most importantly, never asked more of them than he did of himself.
On December 25, 1861, in the midst of war and with Arlington confiscated and
occupied by Union troops, the lonely Lee wrote to Mary:
...In the absence of a home I wish I could purchase Stratford. That is the only
place I could go to, now accessible to us, that would inspire me with feelings
of pleasure and local love. You and the girls could remain there in quiet. It is
a poor place, but we could make enough cornbread and bacon for our support and
the girls could weave us clothes. I wonder if it is for sale and how much.
Sadly, circumstances prevented them from ever returning to Stratford.
Lee's legendary command of the Confederate forces came to an end at Appomattox,
Virginia in April 1865. "There is nothing left for me to do," he said, "but to
go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths." With the
war now over, Lee set an example to all in his refusal to express bitterness.
"Abandon your animosities," he said, "and make your sons Americans." He then set
out to work for a permanent union of the states.
Though his application to regain his citizenship was misplaced and not acted
upon until 1975 - more than a century late - Lee worked tirelessly for a strong
peace. With some hesitation he accepted the presidency of Washington College in
Lexington, Virginia, and there he strove to equip his students with the
character and knowledge he knew would be necessary to restore the war-ravaged
South. Lexington became his home, and there he died of heart problems on October
12, 1870. After his death, his name was joined with that of his lifelong hero,
and Washington College became Washington and Lee University.
At the beginning of the Mexican war he was assigned to duty as chief engineer of
the army under General Wool, his rank being that of captain. His abilities as an
engineer, and his conduct as a soldier, won the special admiration of General
Scott, who attributed the fall of Vera Cruz to his skill, and repeatedly singled
him out for commendation. Lee was thrice brevetted during the war, his last
brevet to the rank of colonel being for services at the storming of Chapultepec.
In 1852 he was assigned to the command of the military academy at West Point,
where he remained for about three years. He wrought great improvements in the
academy, notably enlarging its course of study and bringing it to a rank equal
to that of the best European military schools. In 1855 he was appointed
lieutenant-colonel of the 2d regiment of cavalry, and assigned to duty on the
Texan frontier, where he remained until near the beginning of the civil war,
with the exception of an interval when, in 1859, he was ordered to Washington
and placed in command of the force that was sent against John Brown at Harper's
Ferry.
On 20 April, 1861, three days after the Virginia convention adopted an ordinance
of secession, he resigned his commission, in obedience to his conscientious
conviction that he was bound by the act of his state. His only authenticated
expression of opinion and sentiment on the subject of secession is found in the
following passage from a letter written at the time of his resignation to his
sister, the wife of an officer in the National army; "We are now in a state of
war which will yield to nothing. The whole south is in a state of revolution,
into which Virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn; and though I
recognize no necessity for this state of things, and would have forborne and
pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own
person I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native
state. With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of
an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand
against my relatives, my children, my home. I have therefore resigned my
commission m the army, and, save in defense of my native state--with the sincere
hope that my poor services may never be needed--I hope I may never be called
upon to draw my sword."
Repairing to Richmond, he was made commander-in-chief of the Virginia state
forces, and in May, 1861, when the Confederate government was removed from
Montgomery to Richmond, he was appointed a full general under that government.
During the early months of the war he served inconspicuously in the western part
of Virginia. In the autumn Lee was sent to the coast of South Carolina, where he
planned, and in part constructed, the defensive lines that successfully resisted
all efforts directed against them until the very end of the war. He was ordered
to Richmond, and on 13 March, 1862, assigned to duty "under the direction of the
president," and "charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies
of the Confederacy."
The campaign of the preceding year in Virginia had embraced but one battle of
importance, that of Bull Run or Manassas, and the Confederate success there had
not been followed by anything more active than an advance to Centreville and
Fairfax Court House, with advanced posts on Mason's and Munson's hills. Meantime
McClellan had been engaged in reorganizing the National army, and converting the
raw levies into disciplined troops. When he was finally ready to advance, the
Confederates retired to the south side of the Rappahannock, and when McClellan
transferred his base to Fort Monroe and advanced upon Richmond by way of the
peninsula, General Joseph E. Johnston removed his army to Williamsburg, leaving
Jackson's division in the valley and Ewell's on the line of the Rappahannock.
Johnston fell back in May to make his stand in defense of Richmond immediately
in front of the town. McClellan advanced to a line near the city with his army
of more than 100,000 men, and, under the mistaken impression that Johnston's
force outnumbered his own, waited for McDowell, who was advancing with 40,000
men from the neighborhood of Fredericksburg to join him. To prevent the coming
of this re-enforcement, Lee ordered Ewell to join Jackson, and directed the
latter to attack Banks in the valley of the Shenandoah, drive him across the
Potomac, and thus seem to threaten Washington city. Jackson executed the task
assigned him with such celerity and success as to cause serious apprehension in
Washington. McDowell was recalled, and the re-enforcement of McClellan was
prevented. The latter now established himself on the Chickahominy, with a part
of his army thrown across that stream. A flood came at the end of May, and,
believing that the swollen river effectually isolated this force, General
Johnston attacked it on 31 May, hoping to crush it before assistance could reach
it from the northern side of the river. Thus resulted the battle of Seven Pines,
or Fair Oaks, in which Johnston was seriously wounded and rendered unfit for
further service for a time. McClellan fortified his lines, his left wing lying
near White Oak Swamp, on the south of the Chickahominy, his right extending up
the river to Mechanicsville, and his depot being at the White House on the York
river railroad and the Pamunkey River.
Now, for the first time, General Lee had direct command of a great army
confronting an enemy strongly posted, and his capacity as a strategist 'and
commander was first demonstrated in that bloody and brilliant, but only in part
successful, series of maneuvers and contests known as "the seven days' battle."
He determined to adopt that offensive defense which was always his favorite
method. Instead of awaiting McClellan's attack, he resolved to defend Richmond
by dislodging the foe that threatened it. His plan was secretly to bring
Jackson's force to his aid, and, while holding McClellan in check on the south
side of the river with a part of his force securely entrenched, to transfer the
rest of it to the north side, turn the enemy's flank, and move down the river in
his rear, threatening his communications and compelling him to quit his
entrenchments for a battle in the open, or to abandon his position altogether
and retreat. The first necessity was to fortify the lines south of the river,
and when that was done, General J. E. B. Stuart, with a cavalry column, was sent
to march around McClellan's position, ascertain the condition of the roads in
his rear, and gather such other information as was needed.
Jackson, with his entire force, was brought to Ashland, on the Fredericksburg
railroad, from which point he was to move on 25 June to the neighborhood of
Atlee's Station, and turn the enemy's positions at Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam
on the next day. A. P. Hill's division was to cross the river at Meadow Bridge
as soon as Jackson's movement should uncover it, and Longstreet and D. H. Hill
were to cross in their turn when the passage should be clear. There was a delay
of one day in Jackson's movement, however, so that he did not turn the position
at Beaver Dam until the 27th. A. P. Hill, after waiting until the afternoon of
the 26th for the movement of Jackson to accomplish the intended purpose, pushed
across the river at Meadow Bridge and drove out the force that occupied
Mechanicsville. Longstreet and D. H. Hill also crossed, and the next morning the
works at Beaver Dam were turned and the Confederates pushed forward in their
march down the river, Jackson in advance with D. H. Hill for support, while
Longstreet and A. P. Hill were held in reserve, and upon the right, to attack
McClellan in flank and rear, should he seriously oppose Jackson's advance toward
the York river railroad. There was some miscarriage of plans, due to a mistake
in Jackson's movement, and, in consequence, Longstreet and Hill encountered the
right wing of McClellan's force in a strong position near Gaines's Mills before
the advance under Jackson was engaged at all.
The resistance of the National troops was stubborn, and it was not until after
Jackson came up and joined in the conflict that the position was forced. The
National troops suffered severely, and were finally driven across the river. Lee
now commanded McClellan's communications, and no course was open to the National
general but to save his army by a retreat to the James river, during which
severe battles were fought at Savage's Station and Frazier's Farm. The series of
maneuvers and battles ended in a fierce conflict at Malvern Hill, where the
Confederates suffered terribly in a series of partial and ill-directed assaults
upon a strong position taken by the retreating foe. The bloody repulses thus
inflicted consoled the retreating army somewhat for their disaster, but could
not repair the loss of position already suffered or do more than delay the
retreat. The operations outlined above had brought McClellan's movement against
Richmond to naught, and their moral effect was very great; but Lee was convinced
that he had had and lost an opportunity to compel the actual surrender of his
enemy, though stronger than himself in numbers, and regarded McClellan's escape
upon any terms as a partial failure of his plans, due to accidental
miscarriages.
Having driven McClellan from his position in front of Richmond, and having thus
raised what was in effect the siege of that city, General Lee's desire was to
transfer the scene of operations to a distance from the Confederate capital, and
thus relieve the depression of the southern people which had followed the
general falling back of their armies and the disasters sustained in the west.
McClellan lay at Harrison's Landing, below Richmond, with an army that was still
strong, and while the Confederate capital was no longer in immediate danger, the
withdrawal of the army defending it would invite attack and capture unless
McClellan's withdrawal at the same time could be forced. For effecting that, Lee
calculated upon the apparently excessive concern felt at the north for the
safety of Washington. If he could so dispose of his forces as to put Washington
in actual or seeming danger, he was confident that McClellan's army would be
speedily recalled.
In the mean time, General John Pope, in command of another National army, had
advanced by way of the Orange and Alexandria railroad, with the purpose of
effecting a junction with McClellan and it was necessary to meet the danger from
that quarter without exposing Richmond, as already explained; for if the people
of the north laid excessive stress upon the preservation of Washington from
capture, the people of the south held Richmond in a like sentimental regard.
Jackson was ordered, on 13 July, to Gordonsville with his own and Ewell's
divisions, and he moved thence to Orange Court House, where A. P. Hill was
ordered to join him at the end of the month. With this force Jackson crossed the
Rapidan, attacked a part of Pope's army at Cedar Mountain on 9 Aug., and gained
an advantage, holding the ground until Pope advanced in force two days later,
when he retired to the south of the river.
Lee now hurried troops forward as rapidly as possible, and on 14 Aug. took
personal command on the Rapidan. His force was slightly superior to Pope's, and,
as the National commander seemed at that time unaware of the presence of the
main body of the Confederate army, Lee hoped, by a prompt attack, to take him
somewhat unprepared. The movement was planned for 19 Aug., but there was a delay
of a day, and in the mean time Pope had become aware of his danger and withdrawn
behind the Rappahannock, where he had posted his army in a strong position to
oppose a crossing. Finding the advantage of position to be with the enemy, Lee
moved up the river, Pope keeping pace with him until a point near Warrenton
Springs was reached. There Lee halted and made a demonstration as if to cross,
on 24 Aug., while Jackson, crossing about eight miles above, made a rapid march
around Bull Run Mountain and through Thoroughfare Gap, to gain the enemy's rear.
The movement was completely successful, and on the 26th Jackson reached Manassas
Junction, capturing the supply depots there. As soon as Pope discovered the
movement he withdrew to protect his communications. Longstreet at once marched
to join Jackson, following the same route and effecting a junction on the
morning of 29 Aug., on the same field on which the first battle of Manassas or
Bull Run was fought in 1861. Pope's army, re-enforced from McClellan's, was in
position, and battle was joined that afternoon. The National assaults upon Lee's
lines on that day and the next were determined but unsuccessful, and on 30 Aug.
the Confederates succeeded in driving their enemy across Bull Run to
Centreville. Lee, re-enforced, turned the position on 1 Sept., and Pope retired
toward Washington.
The way was now clear for the further offensive operations that Lee
contemplated. The transfer of McClellan's invading force to Washington had been
made imperative, and Lee's army, encouraged by success, was again filled with
that confidence in itself and its leader which alone can make an army a fit tool
with which to undertake aggressive enterprises. He determined to transfer the
scene of operations to the enemy's territory. The plan involved the practical
abandonment of his communications so far as the means of subsisting his army was
concerned, but the region into which he planned to march was rich in food and
forage, and, with the aid of his active cavalry under Stuart, he trusted to his
ability to live upon the country. The movement was begun at once, and on 5 Sept.
the army, 45.000 strong, crossed the Potomac and took up a position near
Frederick, Md., from which it might move at will against Washington or Baltimore
or invade Pennsylvania. A strong garrison of National troops still held Harper's
Ferry, to Lee's surprise and somewhat to the disturbance of his plans, as it was
necessary for him to have the route to the valley of Virginia open to his
ammunition trains. On 10 Sept., therefore, he directed Jackson to return to the
south side of the river and advance upon Harper's Ferry from the direction of
Martinsburg while McLaws should seize Maryland Heights, Walker hold Loudon
Heights, and D. H. Hill post himself at Boonsboro' Pass to prevent the escape of
the garrison. Having made these dispositions, Lee moved to Hagerstown to collect
subsistence and to await the capture of Harper's Ferry by his lieutenant, after
which the several divisions were to unite at Boonsboro' or Sharpsburg, as
occasion should determine.
McClellan was at this time advancing at the head of the National army from
Washington, but with unusual deliberation. By one of those mishaps which play so
large a part in military operations, a copy of Lee's order, giving minute
details of his dispositions and plans, fell into McClellan's hands, and that
general, thus fully apprised of the exact whereabouts of every subdivision of
Lee's temporarily scattered forces, made haste to take advantage of his
adversary's unprepared situation. Making a rapid march, on 14 Sept. he fell upon
D. H. Hill's division at Boonsboro' Pass. Hill resisted stubbornly and held his
ground until assistance arrived. During the night Lee withdrew to Sharpsburg,
where news soon reached him of the surrender of Harper's Ferry with about 11,000
men and all its stores. By the 16th the army was again united, except that A. P.
Hill's division had remained at Harper's Ferry to care for the prisoners and
stores. Meantime McClellan had reached Sharpsburg also, and on the 17th battle
was joined.
Neither side having gained a decisive victory, neither was disposed to renew the
contest on the lath, and the day was passed in inactivity. During the night
following Lee re-crossed the Potomac and marched to the neighborhood of
Winchester, where he remained until late in October, the enemy also remaining
inactive until that time, when Lee retired to the line of the Rappahannock. The
conflict at Sharpsburg or Antietam is called a drawn battle, and it was such if
we consider only the immediate result. Neither army overcame the other or gained
a decisive advantage, and neither was in condition, at the end of the affair, to
make effective pursuit should the other retire. But McClellan had had the best
of it in the fight, and Lee's invasion of northern territory was brought to an
end; the battle was thus in effect a victory for the National arms. On the other
hand, if we include tile capture of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, Lee had
inflicted greater loss upon the enemy than he had himself suffered. So far as
the definite objects with which he had undertaken the campaign were concerned,
it had been successful. Richmond had been relieved of present danger. The moral
situation had been reversed for a time. From standing on the defensive, and hard
pressed in front of their own capital, the Confederates had been able to march
into their enemy's country, overthrowing an army on their way, and to put the
National capital upon its defense. The spirits of the southern army and people
were revived, and from that time until the last hour of the war the confidence
of both in the skill of their commander was implicit and unquestioning. Lee was
thenceforth their reliance and the supreme object of their devotion.
General Burnside, having succeeded McClellan in command of the National army,
adopted a new plan of campaign that should threaten Richmond by an advance over
a short line, and at the same time keep Washington always covered. He made his
base upon the Potomac at Acquia Creek. and planned to cross the Rappahannock at
Fredericksburg. The head of his column reached Falmouth, opposite
Fredericksburg, on 17 Nov. Lee moved promptly to meet this new advance, and
occupied a line of hills in rear of the town, which commanded the plain below
and afforded excellent conditions for defense. Here he posted about half his
army, under Longstreet, while D. H.. Hill was at Port Royal, twenty miles below,
and Jackson lay between, prepared to support either wing that might be attacked.
Lee's total force numbered about 80,000 men of all arms; Burnside's about
120,000, of whom 100,000 were thrown across the river on the day of the battle.
The crossing was made on 12 Dec. in two columns, the one at Fredericksburg and
the other three miles below. No serious opposition was made to the crossing, it
being Lee's plan to await attack in his strong position on the crests of the
hills rather than risk an action in the plain below. Burnside spent the 12th in
preparation, and did not advance to the assault until the next morning about ten
o'clock. Two points of attack were chosen, one upon the Confederate right, the
other upon the left. The attack upon the Confederate right was for a time
successful, breaking through the first line of defense at a weak point, but it
was quickly met and repelled by Jackson, who had hurried to the point of danger.
The National troops were forced back and pressed almost to the river, where a
heavy artillery fire checked Jackson's pursuit, and upon his return to the
original line of defense the battle in that quarter ended in Confederate
success, but with about equal losses to the two armies.
On the other side of the field the assaults were repeated and determined, and
resulted in much graver loss to the assailants and much less damage to the
Confederates. The nature of the ground forbade all attempts to turn Lee's left,
and the National troops had no choice but to make a direct advance upon Marye's
Heights. Here Lee was strongly posted with artillery so placed as to enfilade
the line of advance. A little in front of his main line, and on the side of the
hill below, lay a sunken road, flanked by a stone wall running athwart the line
of the National advance, and forming a thoroughly protected ditch. Into this
road about 2,000 infantry had been thrown, and Burnside's columns, as they made
their successive advances up a narrow field, swept by the artillery from above,
came suddenly upon this concealed and well-protected force, and encountered a
withering fire of musketry at short range, which swept them back. The nature of
the obstacle was not discovered by the National commanders, and assault after
assault was made, always with the same result, until the approach of night put
an end to the conflict. The next day Lee waited for the renewal of the assault,
which he had repelled with a comparatively small part of his force, but,
although Burnside remained on the Confederate side of the river, he made no
further attempt to force his adversary's position. He had lost nearly 13,000
men, while Lee's loss was but a little more than 5,000. The National army
re-crossed the river on the 15th, and military operations were suspended for the
winter.
General Joseph Hooker, who succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the
Potomac, planned a spring campaign, the purpose of which was to force Lee out of
his entrenched position at Fredericksburg and overcome him in the field. His
plan of operations was to throw a strong detachment across the river below
Fredericksburg, threatening an assault upon the works there, while with the main
body of his army he should cross the river into the region known as the
Wilderness above the Confederate position, thus compelling Lee to move out of
his entrenchments and march to meet his advance at Chancellorsville. Lee's army
had been weakened by detachments to 57,000 men, while Hooker's strength was
about 120,000, and the National commander hoped to compel the further division
of his adversary's force by occupying a part of it at Fredericksburg. The plan
was admirably conceived, and no operation of the war so severely tested the
skill of Lee or so illustrated his character as did the brief campaign that
followed.
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